This patch was created as follows: 1. Start with: http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/patches/blfs/6.3/\ tcp_wrappers-7.6-shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch 2. Add this change: > -extern char *malloc(); > +/* extern char *malloc(); */ 3. Undo these changes to the "linux:" part of the Makefile: < +MYLIB=-lnsl > +MYLIB= < + NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \ > + NETGROUP= TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/Makefile +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ +GLIBC=$(shell grep -s -c __GLIBC__ /usr/include/features.h) + # @(#) Makefile 1.23 97/03/21 19:27:20 +# unset the HOSTNAME environment variable +HOSTNAME = + what: @echo @echo "Usage: edit the REAL_DAEMON_DIR definition in the Makefile then:" @@ -19,7 +24,7 @@ @echo " generic (most bsd-ish systems with sys5 compatibility)" @echo " 386bsd aix alpha apollo bsdos convex-ultranet dell-gcc dgux dgux543" @echo " dynix epix esix freebsd hpux irix4 irix5 irix6 isc iunix" - @echo " linux machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211" + @echo " linux gnu machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211" @echo " ptx-2.x ptx-generic pyramid sco sco-nis sco-od2 sco-os5 sinix sunos4" @echo " sunos40 sunos5 sysv4 tandem ultrix unicos7 unicos8 unixware1 unixware2" @echo " uts215 uxp" @@ -43,8 +48,8 @@ # Ultrix 4.x SunOS 4.x ConvexOS 10.x Dynix/ptx #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/etc # -# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX -#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin +# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX Linux +REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin # # BSD 4.4 #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/libexec @@ -141,10 +146,21 @@ LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \ EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all +ifneq ($(GLIBC),0) +MYLIB= +endif + linux: @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ - NETGROUP= TLI= EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DBROKEN_SO_LINGER" all + LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \ + NETGROUP= TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \ + EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT" + +gnu: + @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ + LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \ + NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \ + EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DHAVE_STRERROR -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT" # This is good for many SYSV+BSD hybrids with NIS, probably also for HP-UX 7.x. hpux hpux8 hpux9 hpux10: @@ -391,7 +407,7 @@ # the ones provided with this source distribution. The environ.c module # implements setenv(), getenv(), and putenv(). -AUX_OBJ= setenv.o +#AUX_OBJ= setenv.o #AUX_OBJ= environ.o #AUX_OBJ= environ.o strcasecmp.o @@ -454,7 +470,8 @@ # host name aliases. Compile with -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG to work # around this. The workaround does no harm on other Solaris versions. -BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK +BUGS = +#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DINET_ADDR_BUG #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG @@ -464,7 +481,7 @@ # If your system supports NIS or YP-style netgroups, enable the following # macro definition. Netgroups are used only for host access control. # -#NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP +NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP ############################################################### # System dependencies: whether or not your system has vsyslog() @@ -491,7 +508,7 @@ # Uncomment the next definition to turn on the language extensions # (examples: allow, deny, banners, twist and spawn). # -#STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions. +STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions. ################################################################ # Optional: Changing the default disposition of logfile records @@ -514,7 +531,7 @@ # # The LOG_XXX names below are taken from the /usr/include/syslog.h file. -FACILITY= LOG_MAIL # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use +FACILITY= LOG_DAEMON # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use # The syslog priority at which successful connections are logged. @@ -610,7 +627,7 @@ # Paranoid mode implies hostname lookup. In order to disable hostname # lookups altogether, see the next section. -PARANOID= -DPARANOID +#PARANOID= -DPARANOID ######################################## # Optional: turning off hostname lookups @@ -623,7 +640,7 @@ # In order to perform selective hostname lookups, disable paranoid # mode (see previous section) and comment out the following definition. -HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME +#HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME ############################################# # Optional: Turning on host ADDRESS checking @@ -649,28 +666,46 @@ # source-routed traffic in the kernel. Examples: 4.4BSD derivatives, # Solaris 2.x, and Linux. See your system documentation for details. # -# KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS +KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS ## End configuration options ############################ # Protection against weird shells or weird make programs. +CC = gcc SHELL = /bin/sh -.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c +.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $*.o -c $*.c + +SOMAJOR = 0 +SOMINOR = 7.6 + +LIB = libwrap.a +SHLIB = shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR).$(SOMINOR) +SHLIBSOMAJ= shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) +SHLIBSO = shared/libwrap.so +SHLIBFLAGS = -Lshared -lwrap -CFLAGS = -O -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ +shared/%.o: %.c + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SHCFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + +CFLAGS = -O2 -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ $(BUGS) $(SYSTYPE) $(AUTH) $(UMASK) \ -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" $(STYLE) $(KILL_OPT) \ -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) \ $(UCHAR) $(TABLES) $(STRINGS) $(TLI) $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) $(DOT) \ $(VSYSLOG) $(HOSTNAME) +SHLINKFLAGS = -shared -Xlinker -soname -Xlinker libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) -lc $(LIBS) +SHCFLAGS = -fPIC -shared -D_REENTRANT + LIB_OBJ= hosts_access.o options.o shell_cmd.o rfc931.o eval.o \ hosts_ctl.o refuse.o percent_x.o clean_exit.o $(AUX_OBJ) \ $(FROM_OBJ) fix_options.o socket.o tli.o workarounds.o \ update.o misc.o diag.o percent_m.o myvsyslog.o +SHLIB_OBJ= $(addprefix shared/, $(LIB_OBJ)); + FROM_OBJ= fromhost.o KIT = README miscd.c tcpd.c fromhost.c hosts_access.c shell_cmd.c \ @@ -684,46 +719,80 @@ refuse.c tcpdchk.8 setenv.c inetcf.c inetcf.h scaffold.c \ scaffold.h tcpdmatch.8 README.NIS -LIB = libwrap.a - -all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk +all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk $(LIB) # Invalidate all object files when the compiler options (CFLAGS) have changed. config-check: @set +e; test -n "$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)" || { make; exit 1; } - @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >/tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ - if cmp cflags /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ - then rm /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ - else mv /tmp/cflags.$$$$ cflags ; \ + @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >cflags.new ; \ + if cmp cflags cflags.new ; \ + then rm cflags.new ; \ + else mv cflags.new cflags ; \ fi >/dev/null 2>/dev/null + @if [ ! -d shared ]; then mkdir shared; fi $(LIB): $(LIB_OBJ) rm -f $(LIB) $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $(LIB) $(LIB_OBJ) -$(RANLIB) $(LIB) -tcpd: tcpd.o $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) +$(SHLIB): $(SHLIB_OBJ) + rm -f $(SHLIB) + $(CC) -o $(SHLIB) $(SHLINKFLAGS) $(SHLIB_OBJ) + ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIB)) $(SHLIBSOMAJ) + ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) $(SHLIBSO) + +tcpd: tcpd.o $(SHLIB) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) -miscd: miscd.o $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) +miscd: miscd.o $(SHLIB) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) -safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) +safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(SHLIB) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) TCPDMATCH_OBJ = tcpdmatch.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o -tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) +tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIB) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS) -try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) +try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIB) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) TCPDCHK_OBJ = tcpdchk.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o -tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) +tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIB) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS) + +install: install-lib install-bin install-dev + +install-lib: + install -o root -g root -m 0755 $(SHLIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/ + ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIB)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) + ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSO)) + +install-bin: + install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpd ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ + install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdchk ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ + install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdmatch ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ + install -o root -g root -m 0755 try-from ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ + install -o root -g root -m 0755 safe_finger ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdchk.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 try-from.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdmatch.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 safe_finger.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_options.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/ + +install-dev: + install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.h ${DESTDIR}/usr/include/ + install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(LIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/ + ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/hosts_ctl.3 + ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_init.3 + ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_set.3 shar: $(KIT) @shar $(KIT) @@ -739,7 +808,8 @@ clean: rm -f tcpd miscd safe_finger tcpdmatch tcpdchk try-from *.[oa] core \ - cflags + cflags libwrap*.so* + rm -rf shared tidy: clean chmod -R a+r . @@ -885,5 +955,6 @@ update.o: mystdarg.h update.o: tcpd.h vfprintf.o: cflags +weak_symbols.o: tcpd.h workarounds.o: cflags workarounds.o: tcpd.h --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/fix_options.c +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c @@ -35,7 +35,12 @@ #ifdef IP_OPTIONS unsigned char optbuf[BUFFER_SIZE / 3], *cp; char lbuf[BUFFER_SIZE], *lp; +#if !defined(__GLIBC__) int optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto; +#else /* __GLIBC__ */ + size_t optsize = sizeof(optbuf); + int ipproto; +#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ struct protoent *ip; int fd = request->fd; unsigned int opt; --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/hosts_access.3 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ hosts_access, hosts_ctl, request_init, request_set \- access control library .SH SYNOPSIS .nf -#include "tcpd.h" +#include extern int allow_severity; extern int deny_severity; --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/hosts_access.5 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a quick introduction. .PP -An extended version of the access control language is described in the -\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at -program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS. +The extended version of the access control language is described in the +\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. \fBNote that this language supersedes +the meaning of \fIshell_command\fB as documented below.\fR .PP In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are easier to edit. .IP \(bu -Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored. +Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character are ignored. This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables are easier to read. .IP \(bu @@ -69,26 +69,33 @@ .SH PATTERNS The access control language implements the following patterns: .IP \(bu -A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if +A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name is matched if the last components of its name match the specified pattern. For -example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name -`wzv.win.tue.nl\'. +example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host name +`wzv.win.tue.nl'. .IP \(bu -A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if +A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is matched if its first numeric fields match the given string. For example, the -pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the +pattern `131.155.' matches the address of (almost) every host on the Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x). .IP \(bu -A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS +A string that begins with an `@' character is treated as an NIS (formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported for daemon process names or for client user names. .IP \(bu -An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a -`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the -bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask -pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the -range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'. +An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as a +`net/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is equal to the +bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example, the net/mask +pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0' matches every address in the +range `131.155.72.0' through `131.155.73.255'. +.IP \(bu +A string that begins with a `/' character is treated as a file +name. A host name or address is matched if it matches any host name +or address pattern listed in the named file. The file format is +zero or more lines with zero or more host name or address patterns +separated by whitespace. A file name pattern can be used anywhere +a host name or address pattern can be used. .SH WILDCARDS The access control language supports explicit wildcards: .IP ALL @@ -115,19 +122,19 @@ .ne 6 .SH OPERATORS .IP EXCEPT -Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct +Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this construct matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches \fIlist_2\fR. The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control -language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\' -would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'. +language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c' +would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))'. .br .ne 6 .SH SHELL COMMANDS If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that command is subjected to % substitutions (see next section). The result is executed by a \fI/bin/sh\fR child process with standard -input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&\' +input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&' at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has completed. .PP @@ -159,7 +166,7 @@ .IP %u The client user name (or "unknown"). .IP %% -Expands to a single `%\' character. +Expands to a single `%' character. .PP Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by underscores. @@ -243,9 +250,9 @@ less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that -the client\'s IDENT server is lying. +the client's IDENT server is lying. .PP -Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services. +Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services. .SH EXAMPLES The language is flexible enough that different types of access control policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language @@ -285,7 +292,7 @@ .br ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu .PP -The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\' +The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.' in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP netgroup. The second rule permits access from all hosts in the \fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of @@ -322,8 +329,8 @@ /etc/hosts.deny: .in +3 .nf -in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ - /usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) & +in.tftpd: ALL: (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ + /usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) & .fi .PP The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be @@ -349,7 +356,7 @@ capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not terminated by a newline character; when the result of % expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails -that shouldn\'t. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon. +that shouldn't. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon. .SH FILES .na .nf --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/hosts_access.c +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c @@ -240,6 +240,26 @@ } } +/* hostfile_match - look up host patterns from file */ + +static int hostfile_match(path, host) +char *path; +struct hosts_info *host; +{ + char tok[BUFSIZ]; + int match = NO; + FILE *fp; + + if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) { + while (fscanf(fp, "%s", tok) == 1 && !(match = host_match(tok, host))) + /* void */ ; + fclose(fp); + } else if (errno != ENOENT) { + tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", path); + } + return (match); +} + /* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */ static int host_match(tok, host) @@ -267,6 +287,8 @@ tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled"); /* not tcpd_jump() */ return (NO); #endif + } else if (tok[0] == '/') { /* /file hack */ + return (hostfile_match(tok, host)); } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* check address and name */ char *name = eval_hostname(host); return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name)); --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/hosts_options.5 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 @@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after performing the % expansions described in the hosts_access(5) manual page. The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr -connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the +connected to the null device, so that it won't mess up the conversation with the client host. Example: .sp .nf .ti +3 -spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/ucb/mail root) & +spawn (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/bin/mail root) & .fi .sp executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/options.c +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/options.c @@ -473,6 +473,9 @@ #ifdef LOG_CRON "cron", LOG_CRON, #endif +#ifdef LOG_FTP + "ftp", LOG_FTP, +#endif #ifdef LOG_LOCAL0 "local0", LOG_LOCAL0, #endif --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/percent_m.c +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include extern int errno; -#ifndef SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED +#if !defined(SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED) && !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) extern char *sys_errlist[]; extern int sys_nerr; #endif @@ -29,11 +29,15 @@ while (*bp = *cp) if (*cp == '%' && cp[1] == 'm') { +#ifdef HAVE_STRERROR + strcpy(bp, strerror(errno)); +#else if (errno < sys_nerr && errno > 0) { strcpy(bp, sys_errlist[errno]); } else { sprintf(bp, "Unknown error %d", errno); } +#endif bp += strlen(bp); cp += 2; } else { --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/rfc931.c +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT;/* Global so it can be changed */ -static jmp_buf timebuf; +static sigjmp_buf timebuf; /* fsocket - open stdio stream on top of socket */ @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static void timeout(sig) int sig; { - longjmp(timebuf, sig); + siglongjmp(timebuf, sig); } /* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures */ @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ * Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server. */ - if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) { + if (sigsetjmp(timebuf,1) == 0) { signal(SIGALRM, timeout); alarm(rfc931_timeout); --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/safe_finger.8 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.8 @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +.TH SAFE_FINGER 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" +.SH NAME +safe_finger \- finger client wrapper that protects against nasty stuff +from finger servers +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B safe_finger [finger_options] +.SH DESCRIPTION +The +.B safe_finger +command protects against nasty stuff from finger servers. Use this +program for automatic reverse finger probes from the +.B tcp_wrapper +.B (tcpd) +, not the raw finger command. The +.B safe_finger +command makes sure that the finger client is not run with root +privileges. It also runs the finger client with a defined PATH +environment. +.B safe_finger +will also protect you from problems caused by the output of some +finger servers. The problem: some programs may react to stuff in +the first column. Other programs may get upset by thrash anywhere +on a line. File systems may fill up as the finger server keeps +sending data. Text editors may bomb out on extremely long lines. +The finger server may take forever because it is somehow wedged. +.B safe_finger +takes care of all this badness. +.SH SEE ALSO +.BR hosts_access (5), +.BR hosts_options (5), +.BR tcpd (8) +.SH AUTHOR +Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. + --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/safe_finger.c +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.c @@ -26,21 +26,24 @@ #include #include #include +#include extern void exit(); /* Local stuff */ -char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb:/usr/bsd:/etc:/usr/etc:/usr/sbin"; +char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin"; #define TIME_LIMIT 60 /* Do not keep listinging forever */ #define INPUT_LENGTH 100000 /* Do not keep listinging forever */ #define LINE_LENGTH 128 /* Editors can choke on long lines */ #define FINGER_PROGRAM "finger" /* Most, if not all, UNIX systems */ #define UNPRIV_NAME "nobody" /* Preferred privilege level */ -#define UNPRIV_UGID 32767 /* Default uid and gid */ +#define UNPRIV_UGID 65534 /* Default uid and gid */ int finger_pid; +int allow_severity = SEVERITY; +int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; void cleanup(sig) int sig; --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/scaffold.c +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ #define INADDR_NONE (-1) /* XXX should be 0xffffffff */ #endif -extern char *malloc(); +/* extern char *malloc(); */ /* Application-specific. */ @@ -180,10 +180,12 @@ /* ARGSUSED */ -void rfc931(request) -struct request_info *request; +void rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest) +struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin; +struct sockaddr_in *our_sin; +char *dest; { - strcpy(request->user, unknown); + strcpy(dest, unknown); } /* check_path - examine accessibility */ --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/socket.c +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c @@ -76,7 +76,11 @@ { static struct sockaddr_in client; static struct sockaddr_in server; +#if !defined (__GLIBC__) int len; +#else /* __GLIBC__ */ + size_t len; +#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ char buf[BUFSIZ]; int fd = request->fd; @@ -224,7 +228,11 @@ { char buf[BUFSIZ]; struct sockaddr_in sin; +#if !defined(__GLIBC__) int size = sizeof(sin); +#else /* __GLIBC__ */ + size_t size = sizeof(sin); +#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ /* * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/tcpd.8 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8 @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ .PP The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have -no `in.\' prefix to their name. +no `in.' prefix to their name. .SH EXAMPLE 2 This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons are left in their original place. @@ -110,26 +110,26 @@ becomes: .sp .ti +5 -finger stream tcp nowait nobody /some/where/tcpd in.fingerd +finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/sbin/tcpd in.fingerd .sp .fi .PP The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the -daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid +daemons have no `in.' prefix to their name, or there is no userid field in the inetd configuration file. .PP Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be -covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) +covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to -execute the `inetimp\' command. +execute the `inetimp' command. .SH EXAMPLE 3 In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret" or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example: .nf .sp - ntalk dgram udp wait root /some/where/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd + ntalk dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/tcpd /usr/sbin/in.ntalkd .sp .fi .PP --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/tcpd.h +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h @@ -4,6 +4,25 @@ * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. */ +#ifndef _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H +#define _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H + +/* someone else may have defined this */ +#undef __P + +/* use prototypes if we have an ANSI C compiler or are using C++ */ +#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(__cplusplus) +#define __P(args) args +#else +#define __P(args) () +#endif + +/* Need definitions of struct sockaddr_in and FILE. */ +#include +#include + +__BEGIN_DECLS + /* Structure to describe one communications endpoint. */ #define STRING_LENGTH 128 /* hosts, users, processes */ @@ -25,10 +44,10 @@ char pid[10]; /* access via eval_pid(request) */ struct host_info client[1]; /* client endpoint info */ struct host_info server[1]; /* server endpoint info */ - void (*sink) (); /* datagram sink function or 0 */ - void (*hostname) (); /* address to printable hostname */ - void (*hostaddr) (); /* address to printable address */ - void (*cleanup) (); /* cleanup function or 0 */ + void (*sink) __P((int)); /* datagram sink function or 0 */ + void (*hostname) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable hostname */ + void (*hostaddr) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable address */ + void (*cleanup) __P((struct request_info *)); /* cleanup function or 0 */ struct netconfig *config; /* netdir handle */ }; @@ -61,25 +80,30 @@ /* Global functions. */ #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) -extern void fromhost(); /* get/validate client host info */ +extern void fromhost __P((struct request_info *)); /* get/validate client host info */ #else #define fromhost sock_host /* no TLI support needed */ #endif -extern int hosts_access(); /* access control */ -extern void shell_cmd(); /* execute shell command */ -extern char *percent_x(); /* do % expansion */ -extern void rfc931(); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ -extern void clean_exit(); /* clean up and exit */ -extern void refuse(); /* clean up and exit */ -extern char *xgets(); /* fgets() on steroids */ -extern char *split_at(); /* strchr() and split */ -extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr(); /* restricted inet_addr() */ +extern void shell_cmd __P((char *)); /* execute shell command */ +extern char *percent_x __P((char *, int, char *, struct request_info *)); /* do % expansion */ +extern void rfc931 __P((struct sockaddr_in *, struct sockaddr_in *, char *)); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ +extern void clean_exit __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */ +extern void refuse __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */ +extern char *xgets __P((char *, int, FILE *)); /* fgets() on steroids */ +extern char *split_at __P((char *, int)); /* strchr() and split */ +extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr __P((char *)); /* restricted inet_addr() */ /* Global variables. */ +#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS +extern int allow_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */ +extern int deny_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */ +#else extern int allow_severity; /* for connection logging */ extern int deny_severity; /* for connection logging */ +#endif + extern char *hosts_allow_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ extern char *hosts_deny_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ extern int hosts_access_verbose; /* for verbose matching mode */ @@ -92,9 +116,14 @@ */ #ifdef __STDC__ +extern int hosts_access(struct request_info *request); +extern int hosts_ctl(char *daemon, char *client_name, char *client_addr, + char *client_user); extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *,...); extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *,...); #else +extern int hosts_access(); +extern int hosts_ctl(); extern struct request_info *request_init(); /* initialize request */ extern struct request_info *request_set(); /* update request structure */ #endif @@ -117,27 +146,31 @@ * host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results. */ -extern char *eval_user(); /* client user */ -extern char *eval_hostname(); /* printable hostname */ -extern char *eval_hostaddr(); /* printable host address */ -extern char *eval_hostinfo(); /* host name or address */ -extern char *eval_client(); /* whatever is available */ -extern char *eval_server(); /* whatever is available */ +extern char *eval_user __P((struct request_info *)); /* client user */ +extern char *eval_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable hostname */ +extern char *eval_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); /* printable host address */ +extern char *eval_hostinfo __P((struct host_info *)); /* host name or address */ +extern char *eval_client __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */ +extern char *eval_server __P((struct request_info *)); /* whatever is available */ #define eval_daemon(r) ((r)->daemon) /* daemon process name */ #define eval_pid(r) ((r)->pid) /* process id */ /* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. */ -extern void sock_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses */ -extern void sock_hostname(); /* translate address to hostname */ -extern void sock_hostaddr(); /* address to printable address */ +/* look up endpoint addresses */ +extern void sock_host __P((struct request_info *)); +/* translate address to hostname */ +extern void sock_hostname __P((struct host_info *)); +/* address to printable address */ +extern void sock_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *)); + #define sock_methods(r) \ { (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; } /* The System V Transport-Level Interface (TLI) interface. */ #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) -extern void tli_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */ +extern void tli_host __P((struct request_info *)); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */ #endif /* @@ -178,7 +211,7 @@ * behavior. */ -extern void process_options(); /* execute options */ +extern void process_options __P((char *, struct request_info *)); /* execute options */ extern int dry_run; /* verification flag */ /* Bug workarounds. */ @@ -217,3 +250,7 @@ #define strtok my_strtok extern char *my_strtok(); #endif + +__END_DECLS + +#endif /* tcpd.h */ --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/tcpdchk.c +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c @@ -350,6 +350,8 @@ { if (pat[0] == '@') { tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"@\"", pat); + } else if (pat[0] == '/') { + tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"/\"", pat); } else if (pat[0] == '.') { tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with dot", pat); } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { @@ -382,6 +384,8 @@ { if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"@\"", pat); + } else if (pat[0] == '/') { + tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"/\"", pat); } else if (pat[0] == '.') { tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with dot", pat); } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { @@ -402,8 +406,13 @@ static int check_host(pat) char *pat; { + char buf[BUFSIZ]; char *mask; int addr_count = 1; + FILE *fp; + struct tcpd_context saved_context; + char *cp; + char *wsp = " \t\r\n"; if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ #ifdef NO_NETGRENT @@ -422,6 +431,21 @@ tcpd_warn("netgroup support disabled"); #endif #endif + } else if (pat[0] == '/') { /* /path/name */ + if ((fp = fopen(pat, "r")) != 0) { + saved_context = tcpd_context; + tcpd_context.file = pat; + tcpd_context.line = 0; + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) { + tcpd_context.line++; + for (cp = strtok(buf, wsp); cp; cp = strtok((char *) 0, wsp)) + check_host(cp); + } + tcpd_context = saved_context; + fclose(fp); + } else if (errno != ENOENT) { + tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", pat); + } } else if (mask = split_at(pat, '/')) { /* network/netmask */ if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE) --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/try-from.8 +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/try-from.8 @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +.TH TRY-FROM 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" +.SH NAME +try-from \- test program for the tcp_wrapper +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B try-from +.SH DESCRIPTION +The +.B try-from +command can be called via a remote shell command to find out +if the hostname and address are properly recognized +by the +.B tcp_wrapper +library, if username lookup works, and (SysV only) if the TLI +on top of IP heuristics work. Diagnostics are reported through +.BR syslog (3) +and redirected to stderr. + +Example: + +rsh host /some/where/try-from + +.SH SEE ALSO +.BR hosts_access (5), +.BR hosts_options (5), +.BR tcpd (8) +.SH AUTHOR +Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. + --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/weak_symbols.c +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ + /* + * @(#) weak_symbols.h 1.5 99/12/29 23:50 + * + * Author: Anthony Towns + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS +#include +int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; +int allow_severity = SEVERITY; +#endif --- tcp_wrappers_7.6.old/workarounds.c +++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c @@ -163,7 +163,11 @@ int fix_getpeername(sock, sa, len) int sock; struct sockaddr *sa; +#if !defined(__GLIBC__) int *len; +#else /* __GLIBC__ */ +size_t *len; +#endif /* __GLIBC__ */ { int ret; struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa;